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ABSTRACT
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) have emerged as a major vehicle
to reduce transaction costs associated with defining the limits of
health insurance coverage and to provide appropriate provider
incentives. This paper explains the heterogeneous set of incentives
used by HMOs to reimburse providers and performs empirical tests of
their effectiveness. The empirical analyses reveal that utilization of
health care services is reduced when (1) physician compensation is based
on salary or capitation arrangements rather than some measure of output;
(2) bonuses and paybacks are based on individual rather than group
performance; and (3) when the HMO operates as a proprietary (for-profit)
organization. Utilization is not significantly impacted by incentives
placed on the hospital. Finally, physician ownership of the HMO was
found to lead to higher levels of utilization.
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I . INTRODUCTION
Retrospective fee-for-service contracts between agent-providers
and insurers have found themselves increasingly under attack. Many
claim such arrangements are the major cause of the high cost of health
care services in the United States. These contracts, accompanied by an
insurance industry that is generally passive toward cost containment,
have permitted inefficient levels of utilization of health care
services. In the face of mounting health care premiums, private sector
initiatives spawned new forms of insurance systems. Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs) have emerged as a major vehicle in this effort to
alleviate transactions cost problems associated with defining the limits
2
of coverage and providing appropriate provider incentives. GHAA(1990)
reports that there were 570 HMO plans in operation in 1989 providing
coverage of health care needs for over 32 million people.
Early HMOs were generally homogeneous, organized as staff or
prepaid group practice plans. In this environment, studies providing
aggregate comparisons of utilization levels between HMOs and fee-for-
service providers were meaningful and contributed robust results.
Growth in HMOs over the past decade, particularly physician group
practices (PGP) and independent practice associations(IPA) , has brought
much more heterogeneity into the incentive arrangements between HMOs and
Early treatment of these issues can be found in Feldstein (1973) as
well as Pauly (1969)
.
2
We assume HMOs are inclusive of competitive medical plans even though
technical differences exist.
3insurers. Whereas early staff plans relied on salaried physicians,
the newer PGPs and IPAs utilize an assortment of capitation and fee-for-
service arrangements with doctors, including discounts, withholds and
bonuses. Similarly, levels of coverage are much less uniform among
HMOs than when Luft (1981) provided his definition of HMOs. This change
has been a relatively recent phenomenon. In 1989, over 60 percent of
the plans required a copayment on office visits compared to only 37
percent in 1986; 12 percent required a copayment for hospitalization in
1989 compared to only 5 percent in 1986. (GHAA, 1990) The net result of
these changes is to blur the distinction between the HMO and more
traditional forms of health care insurance. Recent studies of
utilization of are much less robust, as would be expected. (McLaughlin
1988)
Expansion in the variety of financial incentive arrangements
became more prevalent with the growth in HMOs. Members of Congress
became concerned that provider financial incentives would be "too"
effective and result in providers withholding services to the extent
that quality of care might be jeopardized. Hillman (1987) argued that
such compensation schemes drive a wedge between physician incentives to
provide quality care and physician financial incentives. Section 9313
of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA-86)
,
passed by Congress
in 1986, put statutory restrictions on such systems. Among its many
requirements is a prohibition of incentive payments to physicians from
3
Generally, PGPs may or may not be owned by the physicians in the
group and provide services to HMO and non-HMO patients. IPAs are
organizations that negotiate contracts between HMOs and sole
practitioners and small group practices.
hospitals in HMOs serving Medicare patients. It also prohibits such
payments between HMOs and physicians. One caveat in all such
restrictions is required evidence that the potential reductions in
quality of care outweigh the competitive benefits of the incentive
system. Congress has delayed the enactment of the latter restriction
until April 1990 to allow time for analysis of the impacts of different
incentive arrangements on quality of care. The law directs the
Department of Health and Human Services to request exemptions for
arrangements where the perceived minor reductions in quality are
outweighed by larger gains from increased efficiency.
These restrictions have generated research into the micro aspects
of HMO contracts that has coincided with the general interest in the
development and empirical identification of incentive compatible
contracts in principal-agent models. None of the studies of health care
providers have linked financial incentive arrangements to quality of
care. Hillman (1987) and ICF (1988) provide typologies of incentive
arrangements and surveys. Langwell and Nelson (1987) compared
utilization patterns in 17 HMOs with Medicare patients treated in a fee-
for- service setting. They found hospital utilization to be over 33
percent lower for Medicare patients treated by one of the HMOs.
However, they could not differentiate utilization levels across the
various financial incentives arrangements used by these HMO plans.
Hillman, Pauly and Kerstein (1989) provide the first evidence that links
physician behavior directly to various incentive arrangements.
To alter utilization levels, an HMO must somehow make real
resource costs apparent to at least one party involved in the health
4
care episode. There are three possible parties: the patient, the
provider (doctors and/or hospitals) and the insurfer. This
internalization of costs can be categorized into three groups:
i) Patient Incentives: This group includes such controls as co-
payments, deductibles, and indemnity type insurance plans. Any of
these mechanisms returns a sense of price (cost) to the patient.
ii) Provider Incentives
:
These include compensation schemes and
payment mechanisms aimed at making the physician and/or hospital
aware of the real costs of the services provided.
iii) Insurer Measures: This last group includes efforts by the
insurer to directly intervene on the health care decisions. The
most common form of this intervention is referred to as
utilization review.
Our data do not allow us to say much about patient incentives.
Provider incentives are the focus of the most recent literature cited
above. Insurer incentives, e.g. utilization decisions, has not been
subject to empirical investigation.
In this paper, we analyze the types of incentive arrangements used
in a sample of HMOs that operated in the state of Illinois over a three
4
This holds for any insurer, not just HMOs.
Traditional fee-for-service payment by insurers, with no co-payments
or deductibles, offered very little incentive for any decision maker to
consider the real resource costs of the health care services provided.
This results in over utilization of such resources. Of course, more
than one of these three principals could be made to consider real
resource costs.
Data on individual coverage limits and restrictions are not readily
available. We are currently surveying each HMO plan in our sample to
get accurate information on the levels of co-payments, deductibles, and
coverage restrictions in place.
Hillman, et al (1989) and, to some extent, Langwell and Nelson
(1987)
.
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year period. The data set provides a consistent sample of approximately
40 HMOs per year. We attempt to confirm the results of Hillman et al
.
(1989) in regard to the effect of provider incentives on utilization
levels and extend those results in several important areas.
First, we examine the intertemporal learning effects of providers.
Second, we attempt to measure the differential impact of physician
contract incentives and hospital contract incentives on the extent of
hospital admissions. From these results we can determine the extent to
which physicians act as sole agents or as co-agents with the hospital
administration in affecting utilization of hospital services.
Finally, and most importantly, we provide evidence on the impact
of the third form of control, namely management review. Our measure of
this control is indirect. Specifically, we make some assumptions about
the implications of HMO ownership on the type of provider contract used
in these plans. The results reveal that ownership is a very important
determinant of contract form and utilization.
In the next section we provide a description of the changes that
have taken place in the contractual relationships between providers and
third-party payers. This section includes a typology of incentive
arrangements and review of existing studies that have examined the
impact of these arrangements on levels of utilization. The third
section contains a principal-agent framework from which the hypotheses
are developed that are tested and reported in the fourth section.
Conclusions are contained in the last section.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF HMO UTILIZATION
Health care services markets have been plagued with inefficiencies
generally construed to result from two types of transaction costs.
These markets function with the physician, the holder of superior
information, acting as agent on behalf of the patient as well as an
agent on behalf of the third-party payer. Traditionally the health care
Q
services were paid for by prearranged, passive third-party payers .
High transactions costs are generated as a result of inefficient
contracts between third-party payers, patients and providers.
The first type of cost is one caused by difficulties in defining
g
the level of coverage. The health care production function is not well
defined. It is difficult to specify a unique relationship between
health care service inputs and health outcomes. Wide variations in
utilization of health care services have been documented. Eisenberg
(1985) reports that these are only partially explained by variations in
demographic and other health status variables. This makes it difficult
to establish coverage parameters and can result in parameters based on
inefficient practice patterns.
The second form of transaction cost centers on the type. of
incentives contained in the contract between the third-party payer and
the provider-agent. Due to the problem of defining coverage, insurers
were faced with the dilemma of attempting to provide adequate coverage
to enrollees and guaranteeing reasonable participation of physicians and
Q
For a good discussion of the growth of third-party payment
mechanisms, see Evans (1983).
g
See, for example, Zeckhauser (1970) or Zeckhauser and Zook (1981)
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hospitals. Dominant insurers and public policy makers opted for
coverage based on service benefits . Service benefits are defined as
outcomes such as a pregnancy and delivery or an appendectomy. Providers
were reimbursed on the basis of units of service contained within the
service benefit package such as days in hospital room, transfusions,
operating room and physician visits. Deductibles and copayments were
limited in use. Providers were reimbursed on formulas based on
retrospective fee-for-service . The formulas were set by a variety of
cost-plus pricing mechanisms.
The extent to which various parties behave efficiently depends on
the manner in which cost is spread among the parties to the contract.
These fee-for-service contracts shifted all costs associated with excess
utilization from the patient and provider to the third-party. This
generated classic conditions for moral hazard. The results of moral
hazard -- excessive levels of overall spending for health care services
and for specific types of services -- have been documented elsewhere.
Various changes in the patient contracts have emerged in an effort
to generate increased efficiency in the utilization of health services.
On the patient side, copayments are being used more frequently. These
increase the marginal cost of utilization to patients, putting some of
the cost of the service directly on one of the decision makers.
More dramatic changes have occurred in provider contracts. These
include the well documented growth in HMOs. The early HMOs were
10
See Pauly (1969) for an excellent discussion.
Feldstein (1973) and Pauly (1969) provide good documentation.
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predominantly staff models in which physicians were salaried and served
only HMO patients . Providers may have an incentive to provide more than
efficient levels of services as long as salaries are not based on
utilization levels. PGPs , Networks, and IPAs have very heterogeneous
12
contractual arrangements . This may explain the wide range in
estimates of utilization differences between HMOs and fee-for-service
providers. Prior studies have found levels of hospital utilization to be
lower for HMO enrollees than for fee-for-service patients. Effects of
HMOs on utilization of other types of provider services have not been as
well documented. Luft (1981) found levels of hospital utilization
reduced from 20 to 40 percent in different plans. Others have found
IPAs to have no effect on utilization. (Hornbrook and Berki , 1985)
Still others have examined only PGPs due to the heterogeneity introduced
by IPAs (Manning et al
.
, 1984). These studies are missing important
variations in incentives when contract specifications are not explicitly
enumerated. The next section will consider a formal model of the
theoretical predictions of the influence on provider behavior of
different types of incentive schemes.
III. MORAL HAZARD AND THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP
A description of the moral hazard problem involved in the
relationship between the HMO and its physicians is developed in this
section. This scenario is a principal-agent relationship with
12
Networks are HMOs that contract for services with more than one PGP
or combination of PGP and IPA.
.
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asymmetric information. The objective is to develop optimal incentive
contracts between the agent and the principle.
In the principal -agent game, one player (an agent) performs a task
13
for another player (the principal). ' The principal has an information
disadvantage. Differences in the quality of outcome or effort put forth
by the agent cannot be distinguished from underlying changes in the
state of nature. For example, an employer has difficulty judging if the
laborer's slow pace toward completion of the task is due to shirking or
an unexpectedly difficult task. In the present case, the HMO manager
cannot be sure if the provider effort level is high, for example, due to
"demand inducement" on the part of the physician or because the
particular incidence of adverse health has pressing complications.
Consider a simple principal-agent setup in which the agent chooses
some effort level e which, when combined with a random variable $
representing the state of nature, produces a profit for the principal,
ir(e,<t>). For his effort, the agent receives a reward w. The principal
must devise an optimal payment schedule w to maximize the function
(1) E[7r(e,0) - w)
where E is the standard expectation operator over the random variable
The agent wishes to maximize expected utility expressed as a
function of the payment received and the effort devoted to the task:
U(w,e). Under assumptions of working markets for agents, there exists
13
The brief review of the principal-agent relationship that follows
can be supplemented by referring to Harris and Raviv (1978) , Holmstrom
(1979), and Shavell (1979) among others.
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some threshold utility level, the reservation utility UQ , below which
the agent will go elsewhere for employment. Meeting this minimum
utility constraint is referred to as satisfying individual rationality.
In the absence of any information asymmetries, where the firm (the
principal) is risk neutral while the worker (the agent) is risk averse,
the optimal contract calls for a fixed fee regardless of the state of
the world. This is equivalent to paying the agent a fixed salary.
Moral hazard can result if there are information asymmetries such
that the principal is unable to ascertain whether the appropriate level
of effort is being put forth by the agent. If all that is observed is
the outcome, ir(e,(f>) and the agent is risk neutral, we can write the
agent's utility function as w(ir(e ,<f>)) - v(e) . Here v(e) denotes the
agent's disutility from performing the effort (the cost of the effort),
The principal now maximizes the function:
(2) E[7r(e,</>) - w(T(e,0))]
subject to the individual rationality constraint. Since we know that
U(e,0) = w(7r(e,</>)) - v(e)
,
we can rewrite (2) as:
(3) E[7r(e,(/>)] - E[U(w,e)] - v(e)
Adding the individual rationality constraint, equation (3) can be
rewritten in the form:
W E[7r(e,4>)] - v(e) - UQ
For risk neutral principals, the solution to this maximization results
in the principal offering the agent a contract w = tt(-) - p where p is
*
simply the solution value of (4) at the level of effort e which
maximizes (4). Thus, the principal offers the agent a sharing contract.
Since all the principal can observe is the outcome x, it is optimal to
- 11 -
tie compensation to this value. The agent's preferences are brought in
14
line with those of the principal.
Now consider the incentives for the physician. The physician
makes a decision about how much effort to use to treat a patient. The
effort is some given level of health care, which we will denote by the
term 7. This level of care, or more specifically the appropriate level
and mix of inputs necessary to efficiently treat the patient, usually is
not observable by the HMO manager due to information asymmetries about
the actual health status of the individual. All the manager sees is the
outcome (the profit).
The unknown information in the present health care model is the
actual health status of the patient upon initiation of the health care
treatment session. Let this state of nature defining the actual health
status of the patient be denoted by. Given a level of care, 7, the
profit earned by the HMO is ir(y,d). The principal must structure
compensation such that the agent does not shirk.
In most principal-agent relationships it is assumed that profit to
the principal increases in effort. The present case is somewhat
different. Rather than being a monotonic function of effort, profit for
the HMO is increasing and then decreasing in the level of care, 7. The
health of any patient will be unduly poor if the doctor devotes zero
Numerous restrictive assumptions are necessary to get these results.
For an excellent survey of this literature see Grossman and Hart (1983)
or Tirole (1988) .
In cases of not-for-profit HMOs, the manager is still concerned with
maximizing the "residual" during any given time period. The use of this
residual is, of course, the focus of yet another interesting bargaining
process. See, for example, Arnould and DeBrock (1985).
- 12 -
attention to the patient's case and the HMO will lose profits due to
reduced reputation, consumer switching and possible litigation. On the
other hand, excess utilization will result in negative profits for the
HMO if the physician provides an extreme amount of attention to each
patient. Marginal revenue of successive tests is, at best, constant.
However, marginal resource cost increases as the physician provides
additional tests. These costs include those of the physician and
congestion on jointly used devices (X-rays) and support personnel.
Profit to the HMO will decline if these costs exceed the marginal
revenue
.
A few reasonable simplifications clarify the description of the
phenomenon. Suppose there are only two possible states that nature can
take. The patient arrives for medical care with underlying levels of
health that are either Bad (0B )or Good (0G ) . The physician observes the
true value of 6. The HMO is unable to determine the true status of 6
but does know the profit functions that would arise conditional upon
realization of 8.
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between this observed profit and
7, the unobserved effort level of the physician, given 6. We assume that
ir(y,d) increases and then decreases in amount of health care delivered by
the doctor, and that the absolute level of profit has a higher potential
1 fi
Instantaneous (static) revenues are constant to an HMO, as
subscribers have paid their premiums in advance. However, we can use
the loosely defined "reputation" effect or the "expected litigation
awards" effect as the proxy for revenue (see, for example, Woodward and
Warren-Boulton (1984)). More than likely, the marginal impact on the
marginal revenue stream from extra care decreases as successive tests
and procedures are performed.
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in states of good health than in poor health. The amount of health care
delivered by the physician will vary across a variety of compensation
agreements offered by the HMO. The physician who faces a salary
independent of the level of effort has incentives to provide the minimum
level of effort because increases in 7 reduce U. If the manager could
not observe the true state of the patient's condition, the physician
would choose effort 7 so as to minimize personal effort subject to the
Profit
Effort
Figure 1
.
minimum profit acceptable to the HMO. Then if #B is the realized state
of nature, the doctor offers 7 , the profit maximizing level of effort
If 6Q is realized, the doctor supplies y 1 and the physician
undersupplies effort.
If the HMO offers a fee-for-service contract, (regardless of the
extent to which such fees may be discounted from usual charges) , the
physician has incentives to oversupply resources in state 8G . Note on
Figure 1 that if #
B
occurs, the physician offers 7 . If $G occurs, the
- 14 -
physician maximizes utility by offering the highest amount of services
possible, subject to the minimum profit constraint: 7 .
The optimal contract with moral hazard makes the physician a
residual claimant. This contract would result in y3 if B is the actual
18
state of health or yu if 9G is the state of health. However, an
efficient outcome is possible if there is only one agent in the firm and
all profits are distributed to that agent. If there are numerous agents
in the firm and the distribution of profits is dependent upon units of
effort of the group . each member will over-utilize.
This model offers several predictions. First, a compensation
scheme based on fee -for- service payments will lead to increases in
health care services by participating physicians ceteris paribus.
Second, compensation based on flat salary will, ceteris paribus, lead to
lower utilization. Third, the HMO can mitigate the moral hazard
problem by appropriately structuring some profit sharing plans. In the
present context, these sharing rules in HMOs take the form of withholds
and bonus arrangements described in the next section. Systems that
distribute more risk and create a greater potential for rewards to the
provider should lead to reductions in health care utilization levels
This representative result occurs only so long as the marginal
utility of income is greater than the marginal disutility of effort.
1 8
Recall that we have assumed, for sake of simplicity, that there are
only two states of the world. If the actual state of nature was
represented by a distribution function, the outcome would be modified.
In addition, if the HMO manager knows less than we have assumed, perhaps
not even understanding the shape of the profit functions, the
misallocations can be even greater. An efficient contract in which the
physician has incentives to use the efficient amount of resources will
contain a fixed wage and a share of the profits.
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relative to the fee- for-service scenario. The empirical section will
provide some tests of these hypotheses based on different fee and bonus
arrangements
.
IV. A WORKING TYPOLOGY
The characteristics of the contractual conditions are delineated
in order to predict the relative weight of each component on the
19behavior of physician- agents . ' The description of plan types and
categorization of contractual arrangements used in this study draws
heavily on the typology developed by ICF (1988)
.
Staff HMO models consist of physicians who are salaried employees
of the plan. Staff models should generate efficient levels of
utilization if salary levels are based on measures of efficiency but
will generate moral hazard if salary is based on units of services
provided. Staff models use the same methods to pay for hospital
services as do other HMO models.
PGP, Network, and IPA models are more complex. First, in these
models HMOs may or may not contract directly with the physicians.
Usually, the HMO pays the PGP and IPA a capitation rate. However, the
PGP or IPA may pay their physicians a salary, capitation rate or fee-
20for- services provided. Although the relationship between the HMO and
PGP or IPA is important, the behavior of the physician should be
19
A model to explain why different contract provisions are adopted by
different HMOs is an interesting issue not addressed in this paper.
20 _
Fee-for-services payment generally is used in connection with a
discount from normal fees. Also, in some cases, the HMO specifies the
nature of the arrangement between the PGP or IPA and individual
physicians
.
- 16 -
influenced more by the nature of the contract between the PGP or IPA and
the physician. ICF (1988) has distinguished three factors in contracts
that may influence the behavior of providers. The risk/reward factor is
a measure of the ability of the payment arrangement to cover utilized
services. The extent of the risk/reward borne by each provider type is
another factor that would influence physician behavior. Finally, the
third factor is the nature of the distribution of the risk/reward among
participating physicians.
The nature of the risk/reward is determined by the degree of
physician participation in surpluses, deficits or both. Physicians in
staff plans are salaried and do not generally participate in deficits
unless the deficits are of a magnitude that requires staff reductions.
These physicians often participate in surpluses through bonus
arrangement. PGP and IPA physicians often are required to share
deficits and surpluses. The mechanics of these arrangements differ.
Physicians may be paid a full fee-for-service price. If deficits occur
in the plan, the physician could be required to return fees to the plan
or the deficit could be withheld from next year's fees. Alternatively,
the contract may specify that a certain percent of the fee or capitation
is to be withheld until the end of the period (usually semi-annually or
annually) , at which time it may be returned to the physician if the plan
does not show a deficit. If the physician only shares in deficits, fees
will be returned to the extent of the withholding. If physicians
participate in surpluses, physicians can be rewarded beyond the level of
the withhold.
Several behavioral issues are raised by these arrangements.
First, do providers suffer from a form of "money illusion" in looking at
- 17 -
such bonuses? Do providers respond the same to the possibility of
having out of pocket charges (in the case of a deficit) as they respond
to having the deficit covered by pools of funds generated from
withholds? We see no basis for a priori responses to this question.
However, a physician with a fee-for-service contract could generate
higher income by expanding units of service beyond the levels that would
provide for a return of the withholds if the provider was not
responsible for out-of-pocket returns in case of deficits.
The extent of risk/reward has numerous dimensions (ICF (1988)
.
One dimension centers on the percent of physician's compensation
generated from the plan. Another dimension focuses on whether or not
the plan limits the physicians risk/rewards of deficits. An adaptation
of the latter dimension is useful for our purposes. We define the
extent of risk/reward to be the breadth of services for which the
physician is "at-risk" or shares in the distribution of surpluses.
Pools of funds may be generated from withholds or administrative fiat
for physicians services, referral services, and hospital services. In
many cases target levels of utilization are established for each type of
service. If the provider utilizes less (more) than the targeted amount
of services the surplus (deficit) from that provider pool is distributed
to the eligible provider. In some cases, physicians are responsible
only for surpluses (deficits) in the physician pool. In other cases
they may share in surpluses (deficits) in other provider pools.
The scope of risk/reward is limited in some plans with a stop-loss
provision. The stop-loss is set at an absolute dollar level. This
amount may be on a per patient level or a number of patients over a
fixed time period. Behavior of the provider should be impacted most
- 18 -
significantly in cases where the physician agent bears risk for the
broadest range of services. In those cases the physician has incentives
to utilize his own services efficiently and to prescribe the most
efficient mix of other health care services.
A key component of contracts instituted to influence behavior is
the method of distributing the deficit or surplus among the physicians?
Distribution can be based on individual or aggregate performance. When
based on individual performance, distribution of deficits/surpluses is
determined by the ability of the individual physician to meet
utilization standards. Plans base aggregate distribution on a variety
of factors such as equal shares, longevity, participation, etc.
Rasmusen (1987) shows theoretical support for the contention that free
rider problems are minimized when distribution is based on individual
performance
.
Additional incentives can be incorporated in contracts with other
types of providers. Those for referral physicians are similar to the
ones just described for primary care physicians, but occur less
frequently. Hospital contracts may be capitation arrangements parallel
those used for physicians, actual or discounted fee- for-service rates,
per diem or DRG rates. Hospital contracts may include some type of
risk/reward arrangement.
In summary, the hypotheses generated from this discussion are that
(1) salary and capitation arrangements where income is independent of
effort (and effort produces negative utility) are expected to provide
greater incentives to reduce utilization than fee-for-service
arrangements; (2) we have no a priori reason to predict different
behavior from deficits versus bonuses; and (3) all such systems are
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expected to be impacted by any sharing rules. Individual distribution
arrangements, less susceptible to free riding than sharing rules based
on group or aggregate utilization, should have a greater impact on
behavior.
Other factors could influence these hypotheses. First, each
payment type can be accompanied with various levels of the other risk
factors. The adjustment of these other factors could reduce or even
reverse any differential impact expected to exist between the basic
schemes. For example, even though capitation is expected to have a
greater dampening effect on physician utilization patterns than fee-for-
service, a generous capitation level and a substantial withhold could
reverse the predicted effects. Second, degree of risk may vary with
other factors such as plan size. It may be less risky to accept
capitation for a sample of patients drawn from a large plan than one
drawn from a small plan if risk is distributed more evenly across larger
groups. Extending the time horizon over which the contract applies
could have similar effects as increasing plan size on normalizing the
risk factor.
Two studies that have attempted to determine the relationship
between incentive arrangements in HMO-provider contracts and utilization
have found very differing results. Each paper reported only on the
conditions contained in physician contracts. Langwell and Nelson (1987)
in a comparison of hospital utilization rates for Medicare beneficiaries
served by 17 HMOs with those served by fee- for-service providers, found
that HMO patients used almost 34 percent fewer hospital days per 1000
enrollees but found no discernable pattern of utilization when
categorized by incentive arrangement. Hillman, Pauly, and Kerstein
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(1989) found hospitalization reduced by 13 percent in salaried plans and
7 percent in capitated plans from fee-for-service levels. Similarly
office visits were reduced most when the physician was individually at
risk for deficits in referral funds. Lessor levels of reductions were
forthcoming from risk associated with the hospital and ancillary service
funds. This effect was stronger in commercial than in not-for-profit
plans . They found none of the additional arrangements such as withholds
and bonuses to be a significant determinant of hospital utilization.
They did not explore the possibility of a learning effect, nor did they
examine the separate influence of hospital incentives.
We extend these empirical examinations in three directions.
First, we test the effect of incentive arrangements on physician
behavior over time. Most physicians have been trained in an environment
in which their behavior is directed toward doing the stipulated
procedures for the patient in the most convenient setting regardless of
Che cost. Incentives to seek the most efficient combination of inputs
have been limited or nonexistent. The most obvious case is the
substitution of out-patient surgery for more expensive in-patient
surgery. Therefore, we hypothesize that physicians do not respond
immediately to the incentive arrangements but change behavior over time.
Alternatively, physicians who extract utility from their independence
and control over their patients' care may resist joining managed care
systems. To overcome this resistance, initially HMOs shift a limited
amount of risk to providers. However, the incentives for providers to
reduce levels of utilization are increased as the physicians become more
accustomed to the HMO.
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Second, controversy exists over whether the physician is the sole
agent for the patient or shares the agency role with the hospital. The
extent to which the latter case is true determines whether hospitals can
influence levels of utilization. Clearly, financial incentives should
increase the efficiency in the production of services. However, these
same incentives may have no effect on the number of services utilized if
the prescription of services is determined solely by the physician, in
which case HMOs could have a greater effect on utilization by making the
physician's risk/reward dependent upon hospital services than by
providing a separate incentive to the hospital. If hospitals have an
influence on utilization we expect capitation to result in the greatest
reductions in utilization and variants of fee-for-service to have the
least
.
The third issue centers on investigating utilization restraint via
means other than physician compensation. Techniques such as utilization
review can be used by HMO management as a way of forcibly restraining
utilization. The HMO might enforce utilization standards by
discontinuing to contract with physicians who are constant violators.
Our approach focuses on the impact of plan ownership on levels of
utilization. HMOs are owned by physician groups, hospitals or
independent insurance operations. Regardless of ownership, the HMO then
contracts with physicians, usually through a group, to provide health
care services. A common model is one in which a physician group owns an
HMO that in turn contracts with the group for the provision of physician
services to the HMO enrollees. The group generally accepts a capitation
rate for providing services to the HMO. Individual physicians share
partnership rights in the physician group. In the more traditional
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format in which the physician group has no involvement in an HMO,
physician's earnings consisted of a base amount plus a distribution of
the surplus. The distribution, to avoid free riders and shirking,
usually is determined by a production formula; that is, each physician's
share of the profits is based on a formula that converts revenues
generated by that physician into a payment to that physician. Various
types of revenues generated carry payout weights ranging from zero to
one. While this mechanism may effectively reduce incentives to free
ride on a fee -for- service system, it increases incentives to provide
additional services.
Many physician groups that subsequently own HMOs have continued to
use this reimbursement scheme for the provision of services to HMO
enrollees . In some cases the production formula remains unchanged. In
others the weight is lower in the production formula for production
credits or payouts generated from the treatment of HMO patients than
those generated from the treatment of fee-for-service patients. A
reduction of the production credit is similar to an increase in the
withhold. However, incentives for the physician to alter utilization or
treatment methods are not materially changed because compensation
remains determined by the units of services provided. This may be
evidence that physicians, when in control, would prefer to minimize
constraints on their own behavior. This assumes that reductions in
freedom of behavior generate disutility to the individual providers.
Clearly the strategic choice of the physician depends on his or
her assumptions about the behavior of the other physicians in the group.
It there is no penalty for excess levels of utilization each physician
will increase production credits as if in the fee-for-service mode.
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Essentially, this is a prisoners dilemma effect in which all physicians
in the group operate at high levels of utilization. Alternatively,
control over the actual utilization by physician members of the group is
expected for HMOs owned by an outside party.. Thus, we expect the HMO
to be more cooperative with their own "members", providing less
utilization review policing mechanisms, where owned by the providers.
Several models of group behavior support this idea. The Median
Voter Model predicts that the leadership of the physician group owning
the HMO would be forced to offer compensation plans most attractive to
the majority of its members. Even though these leaders may understand
the sub-optimality of the non-cooperative result (all doctors over
utilizing in an attempt to gain on the group) , they would be forced to
offer such a mechanism due to the pressure to maintain support of the
majority of the member providers.
Ceteris paribus, utilization rates are expected to be reduced more
in physician owned HMOs in which the capitation of the group is passed
on to the individual physicians than in cases in which the group is
capitated but the individual provider in the group still faces a fee-
for-service compensation arrangement.
V. ESTIMATION OF INCENTIVE EFFECTS ON PHYSICIAN BEHAVIOR
Data
Data used for the empirical specifications come from a sample
drawn from all HMOs in the state of Illinois that filed reports with the
Illinois Department of Insurance. Table 1 lists the variables used.
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Table 1
Variables Names and Descriptions
HMO Plan Characteristics
ADMIT Hospital admissions per 1,000 enrollees
AGE Period of time HMO has been in operation
ENROLL Total enrollment of the HMO
PREM Monthly premiums per HMO member
Market Characteristics (County Level Observations)
PCY Per Capita Income (000s)
EDUC12 Percent of Population 25 years and older
with at least 12 years education
DRPOP Physicians per 100,000 Population
BEDSPOP Hospital Beds per 100,000 Population
Dummy Variables (0-1 indicators)
STOPLOSS Stop-Loss provisions exist
BOWN Physician bonus based on individual utilization
HFFS Hospital payment is fee -for- service
HOSPOWN HMO is owned by the hospital
HCAP Hospital compensation is capitated
MEDICARE HMO accepts medicare payment for members
MDOWN HMO is owned by the physicians
NONPROF HMO has non-profit status
PCAP Physician compensation is straight salary
PFFS Physician compensation is Fee-For-Service
YR86 1986 data
YR87 1987 data
Financial, utilization and contractual data were taken from
reports filed with the Illinois Department of Insurance. Forty one
plans filed financial and utilization data for at least one of the three
years including 1985, 1986 and 1987. Thirty five plans filed reports
containing some information describing contractual arrangements with
providers. Additional data were obtained directly from the plans. Plan
type and age of plan were taken from various issues of Interstudy Edge.
Market characteristics data were taken from the Area Resource File
tapes. After deleting observations with missing variables, plans that
closed, and a plan that merged into another, the data set was reduced to
76 observations. While the number of observations lost clearly is not
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trivial the lost observations appear to be randomly distributed across
plan types.
Empirical Specification:
Several hypotheses were developed regarding physician behavior in
an HMO environment in section III of the paper. These can be summarized
as follows:
•
•
HMOs that compensate physicians on a fee-for-service basis
will have higher utilization levels, ceteris paribus than
those plans where physicians are compensated by flat salary.
Physicians subject to bonus payments (sharing rules) based
on individual behavior will have lower utilization levels
than those whose bonus is based on group behavior.
Managerial control of HMOs may have a significant impact on
types of incentives employed in contracts and on utilization
levels. Plans owned by providers will see less stringent
utilization review and policies.
• Physician behavior will be altered more by actual than by
perceived behavior. That is, older HMOs that have had
incentive effects in place longer will have lower
utilization.
These hypotheses are tested by considering the effects of a variety of
HMO arrangements on utilization while controlling for other plan
characteristics. A description of variables used in the model follows
- 26
Dependent Variable:
The measure of utilization used as the dependent variable is the
21
total number of hospital admissions per 1,000 HMO enrollees, ADMIT.
Independent Variables
:
The independent variables can be grouped into those that measure
the actual contractual arrangements, those that measure HMO specific
characteristics, and characteristics of the individual market served by
the HMO.
Physician Compensation Arrangements: Provider contractual arrangements
are captured with a number of binary variables. The first set of
variables identifies whether the physician is paid on the basis of fee-
for service, PFFS , capitation, PCAP , or salary, PSAL. The hypotheses
predicts that utilization will be higher when the physician is paid on
the basis of fee- for-service . In the actual estimation, PCAP is the
suppressed variable; thus the expected sign of the coefficient on PFFS
is positive. We have no a priori reason for predicting differential
effects on utilization from salary or capitation.
In addition to the basic compensation method, as shown in the
principal-agent discussion above, the optimal compensation system
involves some type of sharing rule. In the present context, these roles
are filled by bonus arrangements. The HMO holds back a certain share of
21
We attempted with limited success to estimate a similar model with
physician encounters as the dependent variable. The lack of
significance may result from the fact that primary care physicians are
an inexpensive input compared to referral physician services and
hospital services. Thus, primary care physicians may be encouraged to
substitute their services for more costly inputs.
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each payment made to its physicians. At the end of the period,
physician are awarded bonuses based on utilization patterns; these
bonuses may depend on individual provider output or the output of the
group. HMOs that base each physicians' bonus on his utilization pattern
are denoted by the variable BOWN. Other plans base the bonus for each
physician on the utilization of a group of physicians. This group could
include the entire corps of physicians in the HMO or a subset of the
physicians. The earlier analysis predicts that the sign of the
coefficients on BOWN should be negative reflecting the greater reaction
to incentives when each physician realizes that the bonus is a direct
23function of his/her own behavior.
Hospital Incentives: Variables identifying whether the hospital is paid
on some form of fee-for-service (HFFS)
,
per diem reimbursement (HPDIEM)
or straight capitation basis (HCAP) are included to determine if
financial incentives directed toward the hospital have an influence on
utilization beyond those directed at the physician. HPDIEM will be the
omitted category in the estimation. The model predicts that hospital
22
The withhold can be an explicit share of each payment or it can be
implicit, coming in the form of residual claims to the HMO at the end of
the period.
23
The actual amount of funds going into the pool are derived from
different sources. BHOSP indicates compensation systems where the
bonuses to physicians are based on utilization of medical and hospital
services. This variable was suppressed because only six observations in
the sample reported that the physician bonus did not depend on hospital
admissions. Additionally this provides further justification for using
hospital utilization to measure effectiveness of physician incentives.
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utilization should be higher if payment is based on HFFS and lower if
,
24
capitated.
Managerial Control: We use the form of ownership, physician owned
(MDOWN) , hospital owned (HOSPOWN) or independently owned, as a measure
25
of the degree of managerial control, ' As discussed above, if providers
control the HMO, we expect to find higher utilization than where an
independent firm owns the plan because the physician gets disutility
from loss of freedom of behavior. The model predicts positive
coefficients on HOSPOWN and MDOWN if provider ownership results in less
. , . . . , 26
restrictive utilization review procedures.
HMO Characteristics: Three variables are included to measure
differentials in individual plan characteristics. Not-for-profit firms
are expected to be less stringent monitors of utilization and thus the
coefficient on NONPROF should be positive. A continuous variable
measuring the number of years the HMO has been in existence, AGE, is
used as a proxy to capture the "experience" on the part of the HMO
managers. Older more established HMOs are expected to monitor and
control utilization and expenditures more efficiently, generating a
negative coefficient on AGE. Conversely, if newer entrants learn from
older firms, the coefficient on AGE should be positive.
24
The hospital incentive mechanism should influence the efficiency and
therefore the cost of units of services produced even if the number of
units is not affected. We do not measure the cost effects.
25
The suppressed category is those HMOs that are independently owned;
i.e. owned by neither the physicians nor the hospital.
The model does not offer any predictions as to the relative size of
the (expected positive) coefficients on MDOWN and HOSPOWN.
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The final measure of plan characteristics is number of enrollees,
ENROLL. All large plans are networks over which administrative control
and monitoring of physicians may be more difficult due to the more
diverse organizations and geographic spread. This should generate a
positive relationship between size and utilization. Number of enrollees
could have a positive or negative impact on risk. Larger plans are less
likely to be impacted by actuarial outliers. However, these plans may
press into a member base that has greater demand for health care
services
.
Patient Characteristics: The data do not provide a detailed breakdown
of demographic characteristics (age, sex, race, etc.) of patients. Nor
do the data inform as to incentives such as extent of coverage,
deductibles, co-insurance, etc. Monthly premiums, PREM, is used as an
indicator of the type of coverage offered to the patient as well as the
characteristics of the patients being covered. Higher values of PREM
correspond to more complete coverage of health care expenditures, older
enrollees, and other demographic characteristics of enrollees. The
coefficient on this variable is expected to be positive. Finally, we
have two dummy variables, YR86 and YR87 used to capture any year to year
differences in the data.
Market Characteristics: Several variables are included to account for
other exogenous differences across markets. No hypotheses about the
coefficients of these variables is predicted by our model. However, the
existence of such data is important to improving the estimates of our
more critical coefficients. On the patient side, we add two variables,
per capita income (PCY) and the percentage of the population 25 years
and older who have at least 12 years of education (EDUC12) . Two
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variables introduced on the provider side are the ratio physicians per
100,000 people, DRPOP, and the ratio of hospital beds per 100,000 people
in the county, BEDSPOP.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in
the estimation.
Table 2.
Descr iptive Stat istics
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
ADMIT 94.9434 33.7066 8.7000 175.5000
MEDICARE 0.2632 0.4433 0.0000 1.0000
HCAP 0.1053 0.3089 0.0000 1.0000
HFFS 0.3553 0.4818 0.0000 1.0000
STOPLOSS 0.4342 0.4989 0.0000 1.0000
YR86 0.3421 0.4776 0.0000 1.0000
YR87 0.3947 0.4920 0.0000 1.0000
HOSPOWN 0.1711 0.3791 0.0000 1.0000
MDOWN 0.1974 0.4007 0.0000 1.0000
PCY 13.6940 0.9892 11.3200 14.3470
EDUC12 67.0132 5.5510 64.0000 81.0000
NONPROF 0.3684 0.4856 0.0000 1.0000
PREM 6.7827 2.4169 0.2770 16.7900
ENROLL 49.4556 74.2424 0.1130 455.8860
AGE 4.2542 6.5442 0.0000 31.6600
PSAL 0.1316 0.3403 0.0000 1.0000
PFFS 0.2632 0.4433 0.0000 1.0000
PBOWN 0.3421 0.4776 0.0000 1.0000
DRPOP 0.2122 0.0595 0.0465 0.2835
BEDSPOP 0.5102 0.0863 0.3003 0.8475
Empirical Results:
Tables 3 provides a listing of the results from estimating the
model. The estimates are reasonable and consistent with the expected
outcomes. The existence of fee-for-service had the indicated sign and
was significant. HMOs with fee-for-service can expect 18 percent higher
hospital admissions over the course of the year than those with salary
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or capitation, given that the mean of ADMIT in this sample was 95. This
difference in utilization is slightly larger difference in utilization
than the one found by Hillman, et al (1989). The strongly negative
coefficient found on PSAL confirms our predictions of significantly
lower levels of hospital admissions when provider compensation is not
directly related to utilization.
Table 3.
Regression Results for ADMIT
R
2
= .649 Degrees of
Standard
Freedom=56
Variable Estimate Error t-value PLIM
CONSTANT -269.606746 292.841075 -0.920659 0.361
MEDICARE 16.364423 12.271759 1.333503 0.188
HCAP -7.076378 12.259224 -0.577229 0.566
HFFS 0.103692 7.354832 0.014098 0.989
STOPLOSS 14.727038 12.003203 1.226926 0.225
YR86 4.139172 7.392539 0.559912 0.578
YR87 5.525436 7.332877 0.753515 0.454
HOSPOWN 20.798744 11.431995 1.819345 0.074
MDOWN 21.467592 16.093408 1.333937 0.188
DRPOP 65.709677 76.649564 0.857274 0.395
PCY 11.364158 11.293220 1.006281 0.319
BEDSPOP 93.411977 50.812285 1.838374 0.071
EDUC12 1.557501 2.134081 0.729823 0.469
NONPROF 31.524180 11.007239 2.863950 0.006
PREM 2.855358 1.846011 1.546771 0.128
ENROLL 0.089379 0.052296 1.709109 0.093
AGE 0.705017 0.837745 0.841566 0.404
PSAL -89.775203 23.776838 -3.775742 0.000
PFFS 17.480257 9.389617 1.861658 0.068
PBOWN -28.103180 7.658132 -3.669717 0.001
Strong confirmation is found for the hypothesis that bonuses based
on a physician's own behavior as opposed to group behavior have more
effect on utilization. Hillman et al (1989) found arrangements such as
bonuses to have no effect beyond that of Che basic payment method. The
number of admissions per 1,000 is 29 percent lower for systems based on
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individual than for aggregate based bonus systems. This provides
evidence that even within HMO models physicians do not trust the
effectiveness of whatever administrative or incentive schemes might be
in place to influence group behavior. The physician responds with more
effective utilization restraints when an HMO bases the physician's bonus
distributions on own behavior,
Both dummy variables indicating ownership of the HMO by provider
groups, our measures of managerial control, have positive coefficients.
However, only the coefficient on HOSPOWN is measured with sufficient
precision to confirm our hypothesis. Effectively, a typical HMO can
expect to have 22 percent less utilization when the management is not
under the control of a provider group. Put differently, our estimates
indicate that strong utilization review is a type of restriction on
providers that is less likely to be imposed by the providers upon
themselves than by independent (non provider owned) HMOs.
In no case were the variables describing the method by which the
hospital was compensated significant. As shown in Table 3, HFFS and
HCAP have the predicted sign but both were not statistically
significant. Although we cannot say anything about the influence of the
hospital payment mechanism on the efficiency of producing a unit of
service, there is no support for the hypothesis that the hospital has an
influence on utilization beyond that of the physician. Clearly, efforts
to develop incentives to generate efficient levels of utilization should
be directed at the physician agent. These results do not support the
contention that the physician and hospital are co-agents.
Not-for-profit status is found to lead to significantly higher
utilization in an HMO. Our estimates indicate that not-for-profit plans
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can expect about 33 percent higher levels of utilization, confirming our
predictions about the relative efficiency of proprietary organizations.
AGE, the proxy of learning and experience on the part of HMO managers,
has a positive impact on ADMIT. However, it was not measured with
enough precision to permit any conclusion.
Size of the HMO, ENROLL, was positive and significant lending
27
support to the contention that size increases the cost of monitoring.
Finally, the variable PREM, used as a proxy for patient demand, has a
positive coefficient, indicating its role as a proxy for both coverage
levels as well as the general health of the membership.
VI. CONCLUSION
Economists have done extensive research on the utilization
patterns of physicians under different health care delivery vehicles.
The results of most of this research confirms that the HMO is a
successful vehicle for cost containment. New and increasingly
complicated contractual arrangements between physicians and HMOs have
led to clear and significant differences in provider incentives and
methods of operation. It is no longer possible to use the term "HMO" as
a generic representation of a cost containment health care delivery
scheme
.
Viewing the primary decision makers in the health care episode as
a triad is a useful device. Patients, providers, and insurers are all
participants in a health care episode. This paper has considered
27
In addition, this coefficient may be evidence that large HMOs move
from "more healthy" populations to riskier membership rolls.
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attempts to restrain utilization via the second and third groups:
providers and insurers. Simple application of the principal-agent model
has been applied to health care markets that provides hypotheses
concerning the amount of provider effort one should expect to see under
different compensation schemes. In addition we presented a method to
proxy the degree of managerial oversight of the utilization decision.
The empirical analysis provides strong evidence to support the
hypotheses that (1) physician behavior is influenced by financial
incentives, (2) managerial control in HMOs not owned by providers
results significantly more stringent controls on utilization, (3) that
reward structures will reduce utilization most if they are not based on
levels of utilization, even at discounted rates, (4) bonus systems are
most effective when they minimize the free rider problems when based on
individual rather than group behavior, and (5) incentives to capture
rents from physician ownership of HMOs do not provide adequate bases for
reducing individual levels of utilization. This latter result may
indicate that physicians are less willing to place controls on
themselves as they are to accept such controls imposed by others.
The results suggest a number of directions for future research on
HMO provider incentives. First, one of the reasons for lack of
precision in some of the estimates is the collinearity among the
variables. This collinearity is the result of the fact that the
relationship between plan type and incentives is not random. There is a
need to examine why different HMOs choose different incentives schemes
in Che first place. A second issue not addressed in this paper is the
primary role of incentives directed to enrollees. Finally, the
availability of more accurate measures of utilization review by
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management would permit a more direct test of our hypothesis concerning
28
the relationship between managerial control and ownership. Hopefully,
future research will confirm the robustness of the results presented in
this paper.
The clear implication is that further empirical research into the
"new competition" in health care delivery must pay careful attention to
the issue of incentives and compensation arrangements . The key feature
of all such plans is an effort to make some decision maker aware of the
resource costs of the health care services requested/provided.
28
These might include evidence of the degree of mandatory reviews,
prior approvals, utilization standards, procedural protocols and
measures that may indicate more stringent managerial control of
utilization.
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